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Abstract
We examine a price competition game between two intermediaries offering to
match two sides of a market on the Internet. Competition is characterized by
asymmetric network externalities.We account for some specificities of cyber-
mediation, in particular access vs usage pricing and the possibility of using
the services of several intermediaries. When only registration fees are used
and agents register with at most one cybermediary, there exists an equilib-
rium where one firm corners the market with positive profits. Introducing
either fees that are contingent on successful matching or the possibility of
registration with two cybermediaries cancels the profit for equilibria where
only one cybermediary receives all the demand. Other types of equilibria are
discussed.
1 Introduction
While the Internet has already stimulated a great deal of work on issues re-
lated to the infrastructure and access (see Varian and Shapiro (1998) for a
general presentation of the economics of the Internet), very little is known
so far on the issues related to the content of the services proposed on the
World Wide Web. Following a study by The University of Austin (inter-
netindicators.com), the activities related to Internet can be decomposed into
four main categories: infrastructures, support applications and services, in-
termediation, sales of good and services on line. The study estimates that
intermediation already accounts for nearly 20% of the total revenue generated
by these activities ($ 524 milliards), of the order of the share of business-to-
business (B2B) e-commerce, and far more than business-to-consumers (B2C)
e-commerce. These figures show that intermediation represents a significant
part of the activity.
The on-going process at work for electronic commerce is often describe as
a process of de-intermediation and re—intermediation which refers to the fact
that the intermediation process eliminates some traditional intermediaries (as
for example banks and brokers in finance) and new forms of intermediation
appear that were not conceivable before (see the survey on e-commerce in The
Economist). The main role of intermediaries is to gather and process informa-
tion on users that visit their website so as to help different classes of agents,
in particular buyers and sellers of one specific good, to find each others. Al-
though intermediaries may also provide services to facilitate transactions, a
specificity of many of them is that they specialize on the pure informational
aspects of intermediation, the physical part being left to sellers’ distribution
system. This article is concerned with this new type of specialized intermedi-
aries, often referred to as cybermediaries. Pure informational intermediation
is for example proposed by providers of on-line dating services that help users
find a “romantic partner” (e.g. match.com); search engines also provide in-
formational intermediation by finding websites that propose services for the
specific need or inquiry on users; auction sites or aggregators of supply and
demand organize on-line markets where information about needs and offers is
critical.1 Even e-commerce firms (e.g. Amazon.com) perform informational
intermediation between readers and books.
The aspect that we want to emphasize here is that the nature of the in-
termediation activity is a source of network externalities. Typically the value
of an intermediary for a buyer relates to the number of goods and sellers that
can be reached through this intermediary, as the value for a seller depends
1See the survey on e-commerce in The Economist and Kaplan and Sawhney (2000).
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on the size of the demand it will face with it. The activity thus involves
asymmetric network effects; one type of users is interested in the number of
users of another type. Moreover, different types of users buy different services
and they face different types of prices. The combination of these two fac-
tors, asymmetric network externality and third degree price discrimination,
opens the possibility of cross-subsidization among users. Indeed, an interme-
diary may subsidy the participation of some agents in order to increase its
attractiveness for other participants. The possibility of cross-subsidization
affects drastically the outcome of competition compared to the more stan-
dard situations with competition and network externalities (as developed by
Katz-Shapiro (1985, 1994) and Farrell-Saloner (1985)).2 This article is a
first attempt to understand some of the consequences of these factors on the
competition between cybermediaries.3 In doing so we will account for some
specificities of cybermediation, and in particular the pricing schemes and the
possibility of multiple registration.
2 A model of intermediation
Consider two classes of economic agents, labelled i = 1 and 2. Each class
consists in a continuum of agents of mass 1. These classes of agents could
represent buyers and sellers, up-stream suppliers and downstream users, elec-
tronic shopping malls and standard consumers,... Each agent on side i of the
market is interested in trading with one specific agent, and only one, on
the other side j of the market for some specific good or service; hence per-
fect matching yields utility ui for type i agent, while the absence of matching
yields zero utility to agents. For later use, we will rank agents so that u1 < u2.
The good offered or demanded by an agent is perfectly observable by an agent
of the other population once they meet, but ex ante there is no chance that
a particular i-agent finds its perfect match within the set of infinitely many
j-agents.
There exists an electronic technology that allows to process, select and
use information on a population of agents. A firm with this technology
acts as a “cybermediary”. A cybermediary helps agents find their perfect
2In a sense the problem can be seen as a problem of network competition with price dis-
crimination. Our work is thus related to the work of Innes-Sexton (1997) which shows how
a monopoly may price-discriminate between similar consumers to prevent the formation
of consumers’ coalitions.
3Yanelle (1996) studies Bertrand competition between intermediaries. A key difference
is that in her model intermediaries buy and resale while in ours they only match buyers
and sellers. The issue of network effect that emerges in our context translates into the
potential rationing of demand in her model.
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match within its population of registered agents, provided the matching agent
belongs has indeed registered. For simplicity, we assume that registration and
connection costs are negligeable. Given that agents are perfectly identical
except with respect to the specific good they are interested in, their decision
to register or to connect to a given cybermediary are independent of the
good they want to trade. Therefore, if in equilibrium nki agents of type
i are registered or connect to a cybermediary k, these nki agents are drawn
randomly among all i-agents and an agent of type j has probability nki ∈ [0, 1]
to find its i-match through this cybermediary k. This agent of type j has
therefore expected utility nki (uj− tkj )− pkj of connecting to cybermediary k if
a price pkj is charged as an up-front connection/registration fee for j-agents
and a price tkj is charged on realized transaction through intermediary k.
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The ability of charging a fee per match depends on the ability to monitor the
transactions, so that we will contrast the case where this is not possible and
the case where it is possible. Moreover we impose that uj ≥ tkj ≥ 0 because
a negative fee would induce false matching to collect the fee. On the other
hand the price pj can be negative. A negative price can be interpreted as
a the consequence of gifts given to joining members, or as the result of the
addition of free services to the basic matching service.
When an agent can register with many cybermediaries as in section 4.3,
the same probabilistic interpretation applies. Let nki denote the proportion
of i-users that register with k and possibly with other intermediaries, and nk,li
the proportion of i-users that register with intermediaries k, l and possibly
others, a type-j agent who only registers with intermediary k has probability
nki to find its i-match, while an agent of type-j who simultaneously registers
to both intermediaries k and l has total probability nki + n
l
i − nk,li to find its
match at one of the two intermediaries. In particular, if all type-j agents
register with some intermediary in equilibrium, a i-agent who registers with
all active cybermediaries will find a match for sure. It is useful to interpret
this modelling option as a multihoming strategy, which increases the prob-
ability of reaching consumers interested in the goods or services offered by
making the firm known to users that visit at least one of many intermediaries’
websites.
3 A monopolist cybermediary
As a benchmark, consider the case of a monopolist cybermediary. The general
form of the pricing strategy we assume consists in access or registration fees,
4Note that we assume that transaction fees do not affect the surplus from trade between
agents, an issue that desserves further investigation.
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pi paid by i-agents who use the service, and taxes on transactions ti charged
on i-agents whenever they find their match through the cybermediary.
The monopolist cybermediary decides upon its pricing strategy P =
(p1, p2, t1, t2), which is then observable by all agents on both sides of the
market. Agents of both classes then decide simultaneously whether they reg-
ister or not. It is obvious that the market allocation that emerges strongly
depends upon the agents’ beliefs about registration decisions by agents of
the other population. Hence the possibility of multiple market allocation
equilibria, which is not surprising with network externalities.5
The timing we consider, and that we extend straightforwardly in case of
competition between intermediaries, deserves some comments. We attempt
to capture the result of a fundamentally dynamic process by way of a static
model, hence with some imperfection. The equilibria we characterize should
be viewed as rational expectation equilibria with respect to users’ decisions,
following the choice of intermediation services prices in the first stage. Note
that, due to the observability of prices, a modification of pj may affect i-users’
beliefs on the decisions of j-agents, and consequently impact both agents i
and j decisions.
A market allocation describes how users of both populations decide and
how many of them register with the cybermediary for given prices. In the
monopolistic case, the market allocation for j-users is determined by their
beliefs on i-users allocation n˜i: j-users will register with the cybermediary
only if pj ≤ n˜i (uj − tj). Moreover, in equilibrium, beliefs should be correct,
n˜i = ni.
Network externalities may cause a coordination failure problem between
the two populations of agents. For non-negative prices P ≥ 0, there always
exist market allocation with bad expectations from agents such that ni(P ) =
0 for all i: there is no way to attract a population as agents are pessimistic
about the other population not bothering to register for intermediation. For
any reasonable prices (i.e. such that ui ≥ pi + ti), there also always exists a
market allocation with more optimistic beliefs where both types join (ni(P ) =
1).
The maximum profit that a monopolist cybermediary can make on this
market corresponds to the full appropriation of the matching surplus gen-
erated by intermediation, that is πM = u1 + u2. With registration prices
pi = ui and no transaction taxes, the good-expectation market allocation
yields maximum profits πM , while the bad-expectation market allocation
yields zero profits. Transaction fees allows the monopolist to capture max-
imum profits while getting rid of the possibility of bad-expectation market
5See Farell-Saloner (1985), Katz-Shapiro (1985, 1994).
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equilibrium, as the monopolist can subsidize access and recover the subsidy
on transaction taxes. In particular, it can propose ti = ui and pi negative
but arbitrarily close to 0. All agents then join because even if they expect
no transaction to take place, they want to cash the subsidy. Thus it is now
possible to secure the monopoly profit πM even if coordination failure occurs.
4 Competition and market dominance
4.1 Competition in access fees for exclusive services
Let us now consider two competing cybermediaries, denoted I and E. We
shall be concerned initially with the analysis of imperfect competition be-
tween both cybermediaries when transaction are difficult to monitor and
intermediation services are exclusive. The difficulty to monitor matches and
transactions implies that the only feasible instruments are access or registra-
tion fees. The exclusivity assumption means that agents can only register
with one intermediary and not with several: e.g. when posting a unique good
to be sold off in auction-like websites, a seller cannot have several parallel
selling procedures running at the same time for the same good, or at least
he suffers a cost of doing so, in terms of reputation loss or future exclusion
from the website where he defaults.
We focus on endogenously extreme asymmetric market structures that
emerge in this setting, where one intermediary, I as in “Incumbent”, is a
dominant firm: if it exists, such an equilibrium has only one active interme-
diary, i.e. nEi = 0 for i = 1, 2, although both firms are ex ante symmetric and
no fixed or entry costs exist. We are particularly interested in determining
the maximum profits that are sustainable by the dominant firm in such an
asymmetric equilibrium with de facto monopolization of the intermediation
market.6
The game is one of simultaneous pricing, where both cybermediaries
choose P k = (pk1, p
k
2) for k = I, E. A market allocation is then character-
ized by the allocation of users
©
nki (P
I , PE)
ª
i,k
such that given any P I , PE
and
©
nki (P
I, PE)
ª
k
,
©
nkj (P
I , PE)
ª
k
for j 6= i is the result of a rational expec-
tation market decision process by j-users. An equilibrium consists of pricing
strategies and a system of market allocations for each possible price system,
such that prices form an Nash equilibrium in the reduced-form pricing game
induced by the system of market allocations.
6A complete analysis of asymmetric equilibria as well as other types of equilibria in
provided is companion papers Jullien [2000] and Caillaud-Jullien [2000].
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The basic intuition is provided by a careful analysis of the best response
of, say cybermediary E to a set of prices (pI1, p
I
2) set by cybermediary I. Fix
(pI1, p
I
2) and consider various pricing possibilities for E. Suppose that users
of both populations hold favorable beliefs for intermediary I so that j-users
think that nIi = 1 whenever it is not irrational for i-users to do so (whenever
it is not a dominated strategy for i-users to register with I); this makes it
harder for intermediary E to attract j-users and therefore to find a profitable
pricing strategy. Cybermediary E must charge prices so that there exist at
least one class i with pEi satisfying:
−pEi > ui − pIi
in order to get some share of the market. Now, provided intermediary E
adopts a pricing strategy that finances defection of one side of the market
(pEi < p
I
i − ui), it is a dominant strategy for i-users to register to E and
j-users cannot rationally believe that nIi = 1. They hold (rational) beliefs
that nEi = 1 and must then consider registering to E as well by comparing
uj − pEj with −pIj and with 0 (if they do not register at all). So, with beliefs
favorable to I, maximal profits for intermediary E are given by:
max
i
©
pIi − ui + u−i + inf
©
pI−i, 0
ªª
,
with prices pEi / pIi − ui and pE−i / u−i + inf
©
pI−i, 0
ª
(we take / as meaning
“slightly smaller than”).
Then, it is easy to find the pricing strategy for cybermediary I that
guarantees that E cannot capture any share of either market, or alternatively,
in a sequential move game, that it cannot enter. It is sufficient to find prices
so that the maximal profit for E is non-positive.
Proposition 1 : There exists a dominant-firm market equilibrium where I
captures all trade and E cannot attract any trade; it involves the following
price system: pI1 = inf {−u1, u1 − u2} < 0, pI2 = u2 and yields profits πI =
inf {u1, u2 − u1} > 0.
In equilibrium, both firms charge the above prices and, following a devia-
tion from the equilibrium prices by one cybermediary, the agents coordinate
on the allocation that is the most unfavorable to this deviating cyberme-
diary. This pricing strategy is characterized by cross-subsidies: the low
externality side of the market is subsidized by the high externality group,
on which the dominant firm recoups the subsidy to group 1 and more by
capturing the whole intermediation surplus u2. Depending on the compar-
ison between u2 − u1 and u1, the motive for the cross-subsidy varies. In
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the case u2 − u1 > u1, I subsidizes agents 1 to prevent E from charging
pE2 = p
I
1 − u1 and pE2 = u2 : E is indeed competing for type-2 agents and
would ”invest” in type-1 as a way to attract group 2. If u2 − u1 > u1,
prices are designed so as to prevent E from charging pE2 sightly negative and
pE1 sightly positive: here E would subsidize group 2 in order to generate
profit on type-1 agents.
As is often the case with direct network externalities, our model with im-
perfect competition and indirect externalities therefore yields quite naturally
strongly asymmetric market structures even though there are no fixed cost
or cost of entry. Users’ beliefs, which can be viewed as reputational capital
or brandname image, plays the role of a powerful barrier to entry.
Finally, it is possible to show that reasonable symmetric equilibria involve
zero profits (see Caillaud-Jullien [2000]), which strengthens the case for the
study of dominant firm equilibria.
4.2 Competition with transaction taxes
In this sub-section, we maintain the assumption that intermediation services
are exclusive so that registration can be made with one or the other interme-
diary, but not for both. We however introduce the possibility of monitoring
transactions through the intermediary’s website and so, for the cybermedi-
aries, the possibility of using transaction taxes as another pricing instrument.
Let us again investigate E’s best response prices to a system (pIi , t
I
i ) for
i = 1, 2, with favorable beliefs for intermediary I. To attract one population
i of users, E must subsidize this population, which can only be done by
paying access bonuses since i expects no transaction to take place through
E. Hence, pEi must be (slightly) below t
I
i + p
I
i − ui. With this subsidy, it
is a dominant strategy for i-users to register to E, irrespective of tEi . So, it
is possible to charge tEi = ui without jeopardizing the shift from I to E by
i-users, and this clearly reduces by an amount ui the cost for E of attracting
group i. Given that i-users now unambiguously register with E, beliefs have
to be that nEi = 1. So, j-users have to compare uj − tEj − pEj with −pIj and
0 and they will decide to register with E provided:
tEj + p
E
j ≤ uj +min
©
pIj , 0
ª
.
The maximal profits for E are then:
max
i=1,2
©
pIi + t
I
i + u−i +min
©
pI−i, 0
ªª
. (1)
A dominant firm structure requires from the dominant firm a pricing
strategy such that the above maximal profits are null, that users agree to
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register with I (i.e. ui ≥ pIi + tIi ) and, though, that the dominant firm profits
are non-negative: pI1+ t
I
1+ p
I
2+ t
I
2 ≥ 0. It follows that the dominant firm has
in fact no market power at all:
Proposition 2 : When cybermediaries compete for exclusive services with
access fees and transaction fees, dominant-firm equilibria exist but imply zero
profits.
Putting E out of the market requires that at least for one i, pIi ≤ −u1−u2.
The maximum profit equilibrium with I-dominance is obtained with: pk1 =
−u1 − u2, tk1 = u1, pk2 = 0 and tk2 = u2 (or symmetrically, changing indices).
The externality generated on one side of the market is taxed away by the
dominant firm (pI2 + t
I
2 = u2) so as to subsidize the other side of the market
by the same amount (pI1 + t
I
1 = −u2), so that one side of the market is
subsidized entirely by the surplus of the other side. The aim of the strategy
is to create a strong bond with one population, financed through the capture
of all surplus from the other side of the market. Potential competition is thus
extremely effective in keeping intermediaries’ profits to the minimum and
avoiding market power due to biased beliefs of users, although it generates
market dominance and a strong pattern of cross-subsidization.
The possibility of using more sophisticated pricing instruments has thus
strong consequences on the result of imperfect competition in intermediation.
It reduces profits: dominant firm equilibria are now extremely costly for
the dominant firm that is unable to draw positive profits from its market
dominance. This conclusion also applies for other types of equilibria, in
particular for symmetric equilibria (see Caillaud-Jullien [2000]).
4.3 Competing cybermediaries and multi-homing
We now relax our exclusivity assumption and we investigate the possibility
for users to register not only with one cybermediary but also with both of
them. This accounts for standard practice of firms posting adds or referencing
products and services on several intermediaries’ website, or of users relying
on several search engines to get a satisfactory answer to their query.
The game is the following. Cybermediaries set prices simultaneously and
publicly; then, all users decide simultaneously on their intermediation service
provider(s). We will proceed as in the sub-section 4.1 by restricting attention
to pricing strategies that only consist in access fees and by analyzing the best
response fromE to a price system (pI1, p
I
2) with meaningful prices, that is with
pki ≤ ui.
First, and very much in the same vein as previously, it is immediate that
with beliefs favorable to I, there is no way for intermediary E to capture
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some share of the market if pE1 > 0 and p
E
2 > 0. Again, intermediary E has
to subsidize one side of the market. But now, any negative price pEi < 0
can attract i-users to E as an additional intermediary, even if they think
that nIj = 1: registering with E then simply allows users to cash the subsidy
without having to forego the positive externality from the other intermediary.
So, attracting one side of the market is less costly for E than with exclusive
services. It is sufficient to grant free access to i-users (actually, to charge an
infinitely small negative price).7
On the other hand, it makes sense to subsidize one side of the market
only if this strategy generates a bandwagon effect and attracts, through the
presence of positive externalities, the other side of the market on which the
intermediary can recoup its losses. With non-exclusive services, it can be
that nEi = 1 while n
I
i is still equal to 1; attracting i-users does not necessarily
mean that they have to quit the other cybermediary. In this case, there is
not necessarily a reason for j-users to switch to intermediary E. To attract
the other side of the market, E must charge pEi / 0 and pEj such that:
uj − pEj ' uj − pIj
that is pEj / pIj . Hence, attracting the other, profitable side of the market
generates smaller profits with non-exclusive services as the externality surplus
cannot be entirely captured.
It is then easy to derive the best profit that E can generate by the choice
of an appropriate price system, when beliefs are favorable to I: it is equal
to max
©
0; pI1; p
I
2
ª
; each case is obtained respectively for prices (pE1 , p
E
2 ) equal
(0, 0), (pI1, 0) and (0, p
I
2). From this characterization, it is immediate that a
dominant firm equilibrium must necessarily entail pIi = 0 for i = 1, 2. Oth-
erwise, there would exist a profitable entry strategy for the inactive firm.
Indeed, as in sub-section 4.2, there exists a dominant firm equilibrium, but
it is a knife-edge case. All prices are null and, although they are indifferent
between all options, users from both sides just choose to register with the cy-
bermediary with the higher reputation. This reputation should be modelled
as the result of some historical, dynamic process and here, it is important
that all users share the same perception of reputation. So, cybermediary I
can be dominant and monopolize the intermediation market, but this does
not generate monopoly profits.
7In the case of multi-homing, there may be additional costs compared to exclusivity.
Indeed the agent must be induced not only to register but also to use the service or at
least to provide the adequate information for E to perform a match. If there is some usage
cost beared by users, they may decide to register but to use only to the other service. One
solution is to propose the subsidy under the form of a free service that is only valuable
when used combined with active participation.
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Proposition 3 : With multi-homing and no transaction fees, there exist
dominant firm equilibria; the dominant firm makes zero profits (and of course
the inactive firm as well) and it grants free access on both sides of the market.
Winning a dominant position is therefore not so attractive for an inter-
mediary when competition develops on non-exclusive services, and potential
competitive pricing strategies force the dominant firm to zero profits.
It is worth mentioning here additional results obtained in Caillaud-Jullien
[2000]. They show that symmetric equilibria imply zero profits as well, except
for one class of equilibrium with one-sided multihoming. As an example, the
following price system: pk1 = 0, p
k
2 =
u2
2
can be sustained as an equilibrium.
The market allocation is such that users of group 1 (who get free access)
split between both cybermediaries, while users of type 2 follow a multihoming
strategy and register with both cybermediaries.8 This symmetric equilibrium
is characterized by peaceful market sharing, where both cybermediaries agree
to grant free access to one group of users and coordinate pricing on the other
group so as to capture and share their entire surplus. Cybermediation profits
are positive in such a configuration.
5 Discussion and further developments
Compared with the benchmark case of competition with exclusivity and sim-
ple access fees, our paper suggests that the availability of more sophisticated
pricing instruments, such as transaction taxes, and the possibility of pursuing
multi-homing strategies, that is several registrations with several intermedi-
aries, may deeply affect the market structure that emerges on the interme-
diation market. Aggressive strategies aiming at keeping the opponent out
of the market and monopolization may be less of an issue, intermediation
profits may be more limited.
This paper obviously misses some important features of intermediation ac-
tivities on the world wide web. In companion papers (Jullien [2000], Caillaud-
Jullien [2000]), we propose a more complete analysis of equilibrium configu-
rations and we take into account connection and configuration costs. Jullien
[2000] also investigates some aspect of differentiation (horizontal or vertical)
among intermediation websites. Differentiation may be the result of tar-
geted audience (B2B vs B2C), or the result of the choice of services provided
in addition to basic intermediation (historic user’s profile, certification,...).
Advertising is a major source of income for large intermediation websites
8Out of the equilibrium path, users follow a market allocation rule that is most favorable
to the non-deviating cybermediary.
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such as Yahoo! ...Because advertising resources (and even more sponsoring)
are directly related to the size of the audience, competition with advertising
resources will result in even lower prices than in our model (see Gaudeul-
Jullien (2000)). Other aspects would be worth investigating such as a more
realistic model of sequential search, the possibility of cybermediaries to play
a role in transaction price formation (see Diamond (1984a)), the monitoring
and screening role of intermediaries (Rubinstein-Wolinski (1987), Diamond
(1984b)) and the impact of intermediation pricing on trade inefficiencies (and
not only on agents’ participation).
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